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Abstract 
It is wrong to force refugees to return to the countries they fled from. It is 
similarly wrong, many argue, to force migrants back to countries with 
life-threatening conditions. I argue that it is additionally wrong to help 
such refugees and migrants voluntarily return whilst failing to inform 
them of the risks. 
 
Drawing on existing data, and original data from East Africa, I describe 
distinct types of cases where such a wrong arises. In “Misinformation 
Cases” officials tell refugees that it is safe to return, when it is not, and 
refugees return who otherwise would have stayed. In “Omission Cases” 
officials do not provide any information, true or false, on countries of 
origin, and refugees return but would not have, had they been better 
informed. In “Relevancy Cases” refugees are misinformed or 
uninformed, but would have returned even if better informed. In all of 
these cases, at least some state officials are blameworthy for their failure 
to inform refugees, and are engaging in a form of wrongful immigration 
control. 
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Every year, hundreds of thousands of refugees repatriate to their 
countries of origin (UNHCR 2012). Many return with little information 
on these countries, having lived abroad most of their lives. They instead 
rely on information from government officials, UN agencies, and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). At times, these officials, agencies, 
and organizations provide inaccurate information. 
 
Consider the following case. Between 2007 and 2009, roughly 1,200 South 
Sudanese refugees in Cairo crossed the Sinai dessert and into Israeli 
territory, where they were given temporary asylum. (Gerver 
forthcoming).  Soon after, an NGO travelled from Israel to South Sudan 
on a fact-finding mission. The director met with ministers in the South 
Sudanese parliament, and saw clinics, markets, and solid buildings, 
taking photographs along the way. She then flew back to Israel and 
showed these photographs to refugees in a community centre, informing 
them that her NGO, Operation Blessing International (OBI), was working 
with the Israeli government to charter flights to South Sudan. She and 
government officials explained that Juba, secondary towns, and rural 
villages had housing, security, schools, universal healthcare, and income-
generating opportunities.1  
 
Nearly all returned to South Sudan, but found none of these amenities. 
Few had reliable shelter, medical care, regular meals, or clean water. 
                                                            
1 Interview with Bol, Juba, 21 December, 2013; Interview with Niko, Juba, 14 December 2013; 
Interview with Tareza, Juba, 25 December 2013 
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Most drank from contaminated rural wells or streams that flow along 
dirt roads in Juba. Some lived off the unreliable charity of distant 
relatives, or the occasional kind stranger in teashops which dot the 
corners of South Sudanese streets. Some started small businesses, but 
they mostly failed. An unknown number died or were killed in ethnic-
based violence, and the majority were displaced within two years 
(Gerver forthcoming). 
 
Current discussions on immigration ethics rarely discuss such cases, 
focusing instead on forced returns. Scholars argue that it is wrong to 
deport an individual to a country where they will be persecuted, or to 
another country of asylum where they will be unable to apply for refugee 
status (Miller 2005; Gibney 2004; Betts 2010). It is also wrong and illegal 
to deny refugees basic necessities, compelling them to return (1951 
Convention; Chimni 2004; Barnett 2001; Bradley 2013; Long 2013; Fouda 
20017), and wrong and illegal to intercept asylum seekers at sea, forcing 
them back to their last unsafe port of departure (ECtHR – Hirsi Jamaa 
and Others v Italy). It may similarly be wrong, and in some cases illegal, 
to deport “survival migrants,” individuals fleeing poverty, lack of 
medical care, or general violence (Betts 2010 and Gibney 2004).2 
 
                                                            
2 Though there are similarities between refugees’ legal and ethical rights, there are certain points of 
departure. Legally, it is widely accepted that an individual is only legally entitled to asylum if they are 
fleeing persecution, torture, or general violence. Ethically, it is widely accepted that an individual is 
entitled to asylum if they are fleeing any life-threatening conditions, including famine. See Gibney 2004; 
Miller 2005 and Hidalgo 2015.  
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Many refugees, asylum seekers, and survival migrants are not forced to 
return in the above senses. Instead, they are misinformed, as seen in 
repatriations to Uganda, Iraq, and Afghanistan over the last two decades 
(Strand 2011, Carr 2014; Walsh et al 1999; England-Nouri 2008). 
Sometimes, the misinformation is about the right to stay: immigration 
officials tell refugees they cannot legally stay when they can (Gerver 
2014). Other times, government officials and NGOs say conditions are 
safe in a country of origin, when they are not (Strand 2011 and Carr 
2014). With over half a million refugees repatriating annually, it is 
unclear who must provide accurate information, if anyone.    
 
We could claim that lying is wrong, just as it is wrong to physically force 
refugees to return. But let us assume that officials and NGOs are not 
lying, because they themselves are misinformed. Unlike physically 
forcing an individual onto a flight, one can give misinformation without 
being aware that one is doing so. And unlike deportations, refugees and 
migrants can avoid the consequences of misinformation if they find 
information themselves. The question is not merely if individuals were 
misinformed, but whether agents helping them return have a duty to 
inform them. 
 
I shall call these agents helping with return “repatriation facilitators.” 
They include NGOs working with the government, as well as civil 
servants working with immigration authorities. They pay for travel back 
to countries of origin, at times arranging travel documentation, 
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sometimes offering a modest stipend during the initial months of return. 
While a growing number of scholars argue that facilitators should refrain 
from assisting with forced returns (Barnett ibid; Gerver ibid), there has 
been little discussion on whether facilitators should refrain from assisting 
with misinformed returns.  
 
This article defends the following claim: If it is wrong to deport an 
individual, due to risks she will face, then governments and organizations have 
moral duties to inform this individual of the risks of voluntarily repatriating. I 
shall defend this claim, and argue that it holds in four distinct types of 
cases.  
 
Section 1 describes what I call “Misinformation Cases.” When 
repatriation facilitators provide misinformation, I argue, they are 
culpable for the resultant misinformed returns. Section 2 describes 
“Omission Cases.” When facilitators merely omit information, they are 
similarly culpable, though their actions may be less wrong than in 
Misinformation Cases. Section 3 describes “Relevancy Cases,” where 
information seems irrelevant to refugees’ decisions to return. Even here 
facilitators act wrongly for failing to inform. Finally, there are 
“Blameworthiness Cases,” which cut across the above three cases. 
Facilitators may be unaware they are misinforming, and so lack the 
intent, motives, or foreseeability to know the consequences of their 
actions. In some such cases facilitators are still culpable for their actions.  
 
6 
 
Before presenting the above four claims, it is necessary to clarify my 
general methodology and assumptions.  
 
My focus is on the moral culpability of repatriation facilitators. I shall 
assume that moral culpability requires three conditions, broadly 
conceived. First, it must be the case that agents have failed to fulfil 
various duties, which I shall specify in the next section. Second, there 
must be what Miller calls “outcome responsibility.” (Miller 2007: 96) The 
failure to fulfil duties must lead to some objectionable outcome, such as a 
reduction in security or autonomy.3 Third, for agents to be culpable they 
must be blameworthy: it must be the case that they had wrongful intent, 
wrongful motives or, at the very least, could foresee the consequences of 
their actions. Sections 2 to 4 focus on establishing whether the first two 
conditions have been met: whether facilitators have failed to fulfil any 
distinct duties to find and disclose information, and whether this lead to 
uninformed returns or a reduction in autonomy. Only in Section 4 
considers the possibility that there was no blameworthiness, and so no 
culpability.  
 
Throughout this article I shall focus on normative, rather than legal 
culpability.4 In particular, I will demonstrate that the duties I describe are 
                                                            
3 I assume that an agent can be responsible for an objectionable outcome without being culpable, but that 
one cannot be culpable without being responsible for an objectionable outcome.  I put aside cases of 
“remedial responsibilities,” described by Miller as the responsibility to remedy past wrongs. It may be the 
case, for example, that states have a duty to help refugees who have returned due to misinformation, 
even if the state was not responsible for the outcome of misinformed returns.  
4 Further justifications are needed to establish whether the normative conclusions I reach are relevant 
within the legal sphere.  
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consistent with three competing normative theories: deontology, 
consequentialism, and virtue ethics. Deontological theories hold that we 
often do not have duties to assist others, if the costs are considerably high 
(Barry and Overland 2013). Whether we do depends on criteria other 
than the consequences of our failure to assist. Consequentialist theories, 
in contrast, hold that we can have very costly obligations to help if the 
benefits are substantial.5 Finally, some virtue ethicists hold that 
individuals ought to be judged by their motivations, rather than only 
their actions or the consequences of their actions (Slote 2001). All three 
theories, I argue, ought to support the notion that misinforming refugees, 
either intentionally or not, is a form of wrongful immigration control. 
 
Though I focus on misinformation, deportation is still highly relevant: I 
wish to explore whether, if it would be wrong to deport an individual, 
the government must inform this individual of the risks of returning. 
There is, of course, great disagreement as to who states should not 
deport, and so by extension there may be disagreement as to who states 
must inform. Some claim states only have a moral duty to avoid 
deportations that are contrary to international law. According to 
international law, it wrong to force an individual back to persecution or, 
in some cases, back to inhumane treatment or general violence.6 In 
                                                            
5 I shall assume a largely utilitarian form of consequentialism (See Singer 2015), but nothing I 
argue is dependent on this formulation of consequentialism.  
6 This is consistent with the legal principle of non-refoulement as outlined in the 1951 Convention 
relating to the status of Refugees. It is illegal to deport individuals to countries where they will be 
persecuted for their ethnicity, religion, political opinions or social identity. The principle of non-
refoulement is broader under The European Convention for Human Rights, which holds that 
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contrast, others claim that deportations are wrong, even if legal, when 
individual will be at risk due to any life-threatening causes, including 
malnutrition or illness in their countries of origin (Gibney 2004 and 
Hidalgo 2015).  
 
For simplicity, I will largely assume that if a country has the capacity to 
accept individuals, it is wrong to deport them to any life-threatening conditions. 
I call all such individuals “refugees.” Though I make this assumption, 
one needn’t accept this assumption to accept my theory regarding 
misinformation: my theory can be plugged into a range of assumptions. 
If you believe an individual should only be protected from deportation if 
they will face persecution in their countries of origin – the common legal 
standard – my theory is only relevant for cases where individuals return 
to persecution because of misinformation. If you believe an individual 
should be protected from deportation if they will face any life-
threatening conditions, my theory is relevant for all cases where 
individuals return to any life-threatening conditions because of 
misinformation. My focus is on the duties to find information when 
deportation is wrong, and not on when deportation is wrong. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
forced returns are illegal if an individual will face inhumane and degrading treatment after being 
deported, including torture, or if they are being deported to a country where they will be unable 
to access refugee status. The principle of non-refoulement in the African Union bans any 
deportations to general violence. See the 1969 AU Convention Governing Specific Aspects of 
Refugee Problems in Africa; The 1951 Convention relating to the status of Refugees and MSS v. 
Belgium and Greece, §10 and §3.; and Gammeltoft-Hansen 2011: 196. 
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Throughout the article, I shall draw on several sources, such as 
government-reports on the feasibility of returns to Iran, Iraq, Eritrea and 
Afghanistan. This is done in order to show that misinformation in 
immigration control is not merely an abstract question, but of current 
global relevancy. However, my primary source will be research on 
misinformation in Israel, drawing upon 126 interviews I conducted with 
former refugees in South Sudan, Uganda, and Ethiopia. This case is 
especially useful because NGOs in Israel worked to avoid 
misinformation, traveling regularly to South Sudan. They still seemed to 
misinform refugees. As such, it was especially unclear whether the 
NGOs and officials acted wrongly, given the efforts they invested. 
Resolving this question requires us to consider not only whether 
misinformation occurred, but who has a duty to find information, given 
the costs involved.  
 
 
1.  Misinformation 
Misinformation Cases occur when repatriation facilitators falsely tell 
refugees there is food and physical security in their countries of origin, 
leading refugees to return who otherwise would have stayed. It is 
unclear if facilitators have committed a wrong against these refugees. 
Though they are giving false information, this is largely because they are 
dependent on existing sources. It may be overly-demanding to claim that 
facilitators ought to conduct their own research on conditions in 
countries of origin. 
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Such was the case in Germany, when in the 1990s the government told 
Bosnian refugees they would receive housing and employment 
assistance upon return, relying on information from official Bosnian 
government sources. None of these services materialized upon return 
(Walsh et al ibid).  In 2005 UNHCR told Afghan refugees in Iran that it 
was safe to return, based on existing reports from Afghanistan. After 
return, refugees immediately faced violent attacks on the border during 
repatriation (England-Nouri ibid: 157-159). Three years later, the 
International Organization of Migration (IOM) in Norway told refugees 
returning to Iraq that there were income-generating activities, but most 
faced sever food insecurity and homelessness after returning (Strand 
ibid). We might believe that facilitators acted wrongly, as they ought to 
have invested more resources in finding accurate information. But 
perhaps facilitators must merely relay information they are told, rather 
than seek information themselves.  
 
The same problem of misinformation continued into the 2010s. In 2011 
the European Return Platform for Unaccompanied Minors (ERPUM) set 
up programs for the repatriation of Afghan youth living in Sweden, 
Norway, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. ERPUM case 
workers promised children access to safe living facilitates, despite the 
Afghan government warning of widespread insecurity (Lemberg-
Pederson 2015: 16-17). Caseworkers in Norway and Sweden were 
explicitly instructed to motivate children to return, telling them that 
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return was in their best interests, despite evidence to the contrary (ibid: 
10).  
 
More generally, misinformation is a problem not only in repatriation, but 
in the initial establishing of asylum claims. In 2014 the Danish 
Immigration Services issued a report claiming that the conditions in 
Eritrea were better than previously reported, and claimed that Eritreans 
would not face retribution or death if they attempted to flee the country 
(Danish Immigration Services 2014; UNHCR 2014). There is no evidence 
that such misinformation encouraged Eritreans to voluntarily repatriate, 
but individual officials may have rejected asylum claims, leading to the 
wrongful forced return of refugees, and raising similar questions 
concerning state responsibilities to gather accurate information. 
 
When the OBI director in Israel began organizing return to South Sudan, 
she tried avoiding mistakes of past repatriations. She was aware that the 
vast majority of South Sudanese in Israel had never lived in South Sudan 
as adults, and so may have been uninformed about conditions in the 
country. She was also aware that, were she to determine whether 
repatriation was informed, there would be a conflict of interest, as she 
was facing pressure from donors to maximize the number who returned. 
She instead hired another organization, the Hebrew Immigrant Aid 
Society (HIAS), to independently determine if consent was informed. If 
HIAS felt that a refugee knew little about their rights in Israel, and little 
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about South Sudan, then HIAS would tell this to OBI, who would then 
reject the refugee’s application.  
 
Unfortunately, HIAS appeared to know little about South Sudan, and so 
largely failed in determining if individuals were uninformed. The HIAS 
training manual for staff only has a short page on the history of the 
country, and some information lacks any sources. For example, the 
manual states, without citations, that although South Sudan “might not 
have the same services as we have in Israel, their family is a significant 
factor for positive mental health.” Many I interviewed after return found 
their extended family unhelpful. The manual also states, “Many 
applicants might not be aware of the entire situation in Sudan. Instead, 
they might only know about the circumstances in their village. This is 
OK.” Villages often lacked basic services and employment, and so 
information on urban centres was essential.  
 
There were different types of misinformation given before return. Thirty-
six of 126 interviewed were wrongly told by various sources that they 
would be detained indefinitely if they stayed, unlikely the case for small 
children and mothers.7 All respondents were told there was universal 
free healthcare in South Sudan, when this was not the case.8 After return, 
three children of subjects in my sample died from illnesses, and of the 
total who returned, at least seven died of malaria within the first three 
                                                            
7 Interview with Sigal Rosen, Tel Aviv, 9 December 2012.  
8 Interview with OBI, Jerusalem, 6 October 2010 
13 
 
months, and at least twenty-two by the first year’s end (Gerver 
forthcoming). 
 
In total, sixty-eight of the respondents recall being told that South Sudan 
was a safe country. Almost a third were told this by government officials, 
and nine were told this by OBI or a UN official. In reality, internal ethnic-
based fighting was continuous as of 2012, when most returned (Ferrie 
2012; Al Jazeera 2011; MSF 2014; Small Arms Survey 2011). Of the 110 
returnees whose conditions I could confirm by 2014, thirty-two adults 
and seven children had fled to UN IDP camps, thirty-seven had fled the 
country, and three adults and two children were killed. 
 
For comparison, I also conducted interviews with twenty-nine 
individuals who returned, or were about to return, to Ethiopia, Guinea, 
Nigeria, Togo, Thailand, and Colombia. IOM, which facilitated their 
return from Israel, provided me their contact details. These individuals 
were better informed, but those returning to Ethiopia, including survival 
migrants, were roughly as misinformed as those I interviewed in South 
Sudan. They were told return was safe, but felt it was not, with four 
displaced after return, and others fearing displacement in the future.  
 
Given the risks of return and widespread misinformation, what are the 
minimal obligations of repatriation facilitators?  
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There are a number of principles that can establish these duties. The 
Good Samaritan Principle holds that, if we can save a life at very little 
cost to ourselves, we ought to do so. This principle, which is highly 
intuitive, also tends to be accepted by a range of deontological, 
consequentialist, and virtue ethicists (Barry and Overland 2012; Gibney 
2004; Athanssoulis 2000: 219-220). In all of the cases cited, facilitators 
could have easily conducted at least some research themselves, reading 
existing reports on malnutrition and healthcare (Green 2012, Brown 2006, 
Cometto 2010), and warning refugees of the risk, preventing unsafe 
returns. Even OBI, who travelled to South Sudan, relied on information 
from ministers in the South Sudanese government, rather than 
independent sources. 
 
Unfortunately, some information is not easily available, and is very 
costly to obtain. The World Bank and the International Labour 
Organization offer no employment statistics on South Sudan (World 
Bank 2014) and Médecins Sans Frontières cannot provide statistics on the 
location of health clinics in the country. There are also no recorded 
mortality rates from ethnic-based violence. Given the lack of available 
information, it is not clear if facilitators should conduct research 
themselves, such as interviewing past returnees in insecure areas. 
 
We might claim that facilitators should conduct such research because 
our general duties towards others extend beyond Good Samaritan duties. 
We ought to help others in great need not only when it is costless, but 
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when it involves moderate costs, so long as we are far more able to bear 
the costs than others (Barry and Overland ibid; Singer 2015).9 If an agent 
has greater access to information, then they ought to find this 
information and disclose this it, if this will significantly help others make 
informed or safer decisions (Miller and Wertheimer 2009). NGOs and 
government agencies may have greater abilities to travel regularly to 
countries of origin, interviewing past returnees, and hiring local research 
assistants if necessary.  
 
Though greater ability to find information may seem a good reason to 
demand more from agents, this conclusion seems inconsistent with 
intuitions about cases outside the sphere of immigration. Imagine I am a 
car mechanic selling you a car. I could run a test that you are not able to 
run, ensuring that the breaks are functioning, and ensuring you do not 
find yourself in a car accident. It would seem unfair to claim I have a 
duty to run this test, while another car owner, who is not a mechanic, 
would have no such duty when selling you their car. While greater 
ability may be a reason to disclose what one knows, it does not follow 
that greater ability to obtain knowledge creates a duty to obtain this 
knowledge.10  
 
There is another consideration, other than greater ability. We often have 
duties to keep our promises. If an NGO promises refugees that they are 
                                                            
9  This an approach supported by both consequentialist and deontological theories. 
10 Even if such demands would ensure optimal consequences, they may create unequal burdens 
and, as such, be unfair.  
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only assisting with informed returns, they have duties to find 
information, to ensure that return really is informed.   
 
This argument, though relevant for many NGOs, is less relevant for 
governments officials, who rarely promise to ensure informed returns. In 
such cases, the value of promise-keeping seems irrelevant. We might still 
suppose that governments should avoid misinforming, because 
misinforming causes harms, and we should generally avoid causing 
harms to others. Two harms, in particular, seem apparent. Misinforming 
causes refugees to make decisions without full information. This 
undermines their ability to make autonomous decisions (Arneson 1994). 
Misinforming also causes refugees to return to unsafe countries who 
otherwise would not have, undermining their security.  
 
This argument is sufficient to claim that governments ought to find 
accurate information when finding information involves moderate costs. 
It is not clear this establishes a duty to find information when this 
involves especially high costs. For, we do not wrong every person we 
cause harm to, if avoiding harm is very difficult. Imagine I purchase an 
airline ticket to Jonglei in South Sudan and ask the pilot if conditions are 
safe in the port of arrival. She says they are, because she has read this in 
the Sudanese Tribune. If the Tribune was mistaken, the pilot’s false 
information may have causally contributed to my harmful decision to 
purchase the ticket, but it is not clear she has wronged me, given that it 
would be more costly for her to seek a more accurate source of 
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information. To establish wrongdoing, it is not enough to establish that 
the absence of information may cause harm, but whether we have a duty 
to find information to prevent harm.  
 
There is a final consideration which, I believe, creates duties for 
governments to find information, even when doing so is costly. 
 
We often have duties to know information that are derived from other 
duties, unrelated to informed consent. For example, drivers have duties 
to look in their rear-view mirror, to know if there is someone behind 
them. This is derived from their duties to avoid running others over 
(Smith 2014). Similarly, drivers may have duties bring their car to be 
inspected for faulty breaks in an annual inspection, similarly to avoid 
running others over. Sometimes, the information we have a duty to 
know also happens to be information we must disclose, in certain 
circumstances. If I have my car inspected and find the breaks are faulty, 
and I want to sell you my car, I should tell you about the faulty breaks. I 
know about the breaks because I have a duty to, in order to ensure safe 
driving, and once I know this information, I have a duty to disclose it in a 
subsequent sale. It is not that I have duty to know about the breaks in 
order to tell you; I have a duty to know and, by chance, this information 
is the sort I need to disclose because I know it. If I am negligent, and do 
not find out about the faulty breaks, and then sell you my car without 
telling you about them, it seems I am partly blameworthy for your 
decision to buy my car without full information. Were I to tell you, “But I 
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did not know about the breaks,” this would seem a poor excuse. For, I 
had a duty to find out about the breaks to be a safe driver. 
 
We may apply similar reasoning to return migration. States have various 
duties which create derivative duties to know. States have a 
“Responsibility to Protect” others from great harm, as outlined in the 
2005 UN World Summit (UN 2005). States also have due diligence 
obligations to prevent human rights violations abroad, and to avoid 
committing human rights violations. This includes the obligation to 
avoid deporting individuals to countries where they might experience 
inhumane treatment (Osman v. United Kingdom, cited by Gammeltoft-
Hansen 2011: 196). These general obligations create duties to know about 
conditions in foreign countries. Immigration officials coordinating return 
may also have agent-specific duties to know about countries of origin to 
establish who is a refugee amongst those who do not wish to return. 
Ignorance about South Sudan, for example, may lead immigration 
official to unjustly reject asylum claims. If states fail to find information 
that is necessary to fulfil these general duties, their ignorance may be a 
poor excuse for their failure to disclose risks to refugees voluntarily 
repatriating. Even if it is questionable whether states ought to invest 
costly resources in ensuring informed repatriation, it seems clearer they 
ought to invest costly resources in preventing mass atrocities and 
establishing who is a refugee. And these duties create derivative duties 
to know about certain countries, creating duties to disclose information 
about these countries.   
19 
 
 
To clarify this point: I am not arguing that we must disclose all 
information we have a duty to know. If my neighbour wants to know 
about the faulty breaks in my car, despite expressing no interest in 
buying my car, I have not wronged the neighbour when I misinform her. 
For, were I to know about the breaks, I would have no duty to tell my 
neighbour about them, even if it would make her happier. Rather, the 
argument is that, when we have a duty to disclose information we know, 
to ensure informed consent, it is not an excuse to say, “I did not know” if 
we ought to have known.  
 
This reasoning would also imply limits to the demands we place on 
facilitators. No facilitator should be required to risk their lives by 
traveling to an insecure area to find out if refugees’ lives will be at risk 
from return. For, they would have no such duty to risk their lives to fulfil 
their other duties as state officials.  But if information is not extremely 
dangerous to obtain, officials should try to obtain it, if they have other 
duties that require this information. While they cannot disclose 
information they do not know, they can choose to know more 
information, which they can then disclose.  
 
 
2. Omission 
While Misinformation Cases involve facilitators providing false 
information, Omission Cases involve facilitators providing no 
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information at all, true or false. It is not clear if facilitators have acted 
unethically, given that there was no explicit misinformation.  
 
Consider the case of Iraqi nationals who returned from Norway with the 
help of IOM, funded by the Norwegian government. A subsequent IOM 
report found that those who returned were never told of the risks of 
return, such as the likely inability to secure a reliable income (Strand 
ibid). Similarly, Iraqi refugees in Denmark recalled not being told 
information on the security situation in Iraq (Bak Riiskjaer and Nielsson 
2008: 7) and refugees returning to Sierra Leone from the UK were never 
informed of the risks of homelessness, common after return (Carr ibid). 
Refugees returning to Sri Lanka were never warned of security risks, 
with many arrested, detained, and some tortured and killed by police 
after repatriation (Carr ibid). In all of these cases, at least some 
individuals returned who otherwise would not have, had they more 
information. It is not clear if facilitators are acting quite as unethically as 
in cases of misinformation, as they may simply assume that refugees 
have information. More generally, perhaps acts of omission are not quite 
so egregious as active acts of misinformation.  
 
In Israel, OBI intended to disclose all risks, but information omissions 
were common. Refugees were never informed that they could not re-
enter Israel once they left,11 as it was assumed they knew this. In general, 
HIAS assumed refugees had information from family members in South 
                                                            
11 Interview with S, an OBI and HIAS Staff member, Tel Aviv, 28 April 2012 
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Sudan, or from their own memories, and so did not seek out and disclose 
information on health, food insecurity, or the death toll in Unity State, 
Jonglei, and other areas of concern. 
 
HIAS’s assumption that individuals had information was not completely 
invalid. Most I interviewed knew they could not re-enter Israel once they 
left, and families and personal memories really were the best sources of 
information for those who went back. Of the nine I interviewed who 
found full employment after return, eight had been told by family 
members that there was employment before return. However, it was also 
the case that, of the nineteen who were told by family that they would 
find employment and shelter if they returned, eleven did not. 
Information from family was the best source, but not a very good source 
in absolute terms.  
 
Given that information may be lacking amongst some, do facilitators 
have a duty to provide information?  
 
A central reason we might suppose facilitators have no duty to disclose 
information, or a lesser duty, is that there is a general distinction between 
doing and allowing, or “positive” and “negative” acts. An example of a 
positive act would be injecting arsenic into a victim, and a negative act 
merely letting a stranger die of arsenic poisoning, rather than calling an 
ambulance. Even if both are impermissible, it seems the former deems a 
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person more culpable than the latter. In a similar manner, perhaps giving 
false information is worse than merely failing to inform (Mahone 2006). 
 
There are three reasons to believe that such a positive/negative 
distinction is normatively relevant. The first reason is that positive acts 
tend to indicate stronger causal relationships to upshots compared to 
negative acts (Callahan 1989).12 If someone injects arsenic into a victim, 
then her actions are necessary and sufficient for the resulting death. If, in 
contrast, an individual merely fails to save the victim of poisoning 
committed by another, the failure to call an ambulance is not sufficient 
for the death: the perpetrator’s injecting of arsenic is also necessary. If a 
refugee has accurate information, and is then misinformed, they may 
suddenly believe a falsehood they did not before, and so the 
misinformation is necessary and sufficient for the outcome of an 
uninformed return. In contrast, if a refugee already holds false 
information from other inaccurate sources, and a facilitator never 
provides accurate information, the facilitator’s omitting information is 
not sufficient for the refugees’ false belief: the refugees’ other inaccurate 
sources are also necessary for the uninformed return. Because most 
normative theories view causing harm as one criteria (thought not the 
only) for determining culpability,13 then most theories ought to generally 
hold positive acts as worse than negative acts.  
                                                            
12 Such a reason would also be supported by deontologists and virtue ethicists who care about 
avoiding negative consequences. 
13 Even theories which view virtuous motives as primary still determine the rightness of motives 
partly based on the extent of causal harm. If, for example, a virtuous person is one who cares 
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Some have criticized this distinction concerning negative and positive 
acts, arguing that many paradigmatic negative acts indicate greater 
causal harm (Howard-Snyder 2011). It certainly seems that omitting 
information often does causally contribute to a false belief in a similar 
manner to misinforming. If a refugee has no information at all on their 
country of origin, and interprets being told no information as a sign of 
safety, the information omission is necessary and sufficient for the 
resulting false belief of safety.  
 
Even if omitting information can causally contribute to false beliefs as 
much as misinforming, there is a second reason omitting may be less 
wrong than misinforming. Some facilitators can legitimately expect 
refugees to have information, and so can legitimately fail to disclose 
information. This is the assumption we often hold in other relationships 
where informed consent is necessary (Manson and O’neill 2007: 68-96). If 
a surgeon tells a patient about an incision, it is reasonable to expect 
patients to know that the incision will be made with a scalpel. Doctors 
can assume that patients make inferences about incisions necessitating 
scalpels, because patients know, in general, that surgery involves 
scalpels. Perhaps it is reasonable to expect refugees to know about the 
countries they are returning to, either because they grew up in these 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
about others, it seems that caring involves, at least some of the time, caring about whether one’s 
actions will case harm. See Slote 2001.  
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countries, or because they can infer from general news stories that there 
is limited security, food, and healthcare in their countries of origin. 
 
The problem with this approach is that it is difficult to know what it 
would be reasonable for refugees to know. Every refugee has their own 
life experiences and their own distinct access to information, some more 
accurate than others. Every refugee is returning to a different 
socioeconomic circumstance, village, and family network, with different 
language skills, resources, and expectations. All surgery is fairly similar 
in some ways, so our knowledge of it is, as well, and our expectations of 
others’ knowledge, as well. The same cannot be said about refugees and 
the places they return to.  
 
There is a final way that positive acts may be distinct from negative acts. 
Positive acts are generally costless to avoid (Bennett 1998). It is costless to 
avoid injecting arsenic into a victim, as this involves merely keeping the 
arsenic at home. It is more costly to save the victim of arsenic, as this 
involves calling an ambulance. When saving a life is very costly, then 
many deontologists would conclude that refraining from saving the life 
is permissible. Virtue ethicists may similarly conclude that a virtuous 
individual can at times fail to save others, given the costs involved. In 
immigration control, it would be costly for an official to find information 
compared to merely avoiding false information, as the former involves 
finding information, while the latter involves merely keeping one’s 
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mouth closed. The official, as such, is less culpable of omitting 
information compared to misinforming. 
 
Nonetheless, omissions can often be as costless to avoid as avoiding 
active acts (ibid; Kagen 1991: 114-115 and 231-270) and, even when 
avoiding omissions is more costly, it can still be relatively costless. When 
HIAS and government officials failed to tell refugees about widespread 
ethnic-based killings in Unity State and Jonglei, they could have easily 
changed their actions by searching the internet for "death toll in Unity 
State" and "death toll in Jonglei," relaying this information without great 
effort. Similarly, when Swedish and Norwegian case workers failed to 
inform children about the risks of returning to Afghanistan, they could 
have easily told them that the government of Afghanistan had warned of 
its inability to ensure protection (Schuster and Majidi 2013). 
 
Even when negative acts are significantly costly to avoid, they may still 
involve culpability.  We can be culpable for negative acts that involve 
costs expected of us to bear, given our unique position, or our other 
duties, as described in the previous section. If governments and NGOs 
ought to have information because of their other general duties, then we 
can expect them to bear the costs of finding and disclosing this 
information. If they do not, they may be acting wrongly, even if slightly 
less wrongly compared to actively misinforming. 
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3. Relevancy 
Until now, the examples I raised concerned facilitators who failed inform 
refugees, and this lead refugees to accept repatriation who otherwise 
would have stayed. There are instances where facilitators fail to inform 
but refugees would have accepted repatriation even if they had been 
fully informed. In such cases, the misinformation turns out to be 
irrelevant, and so it is not clear if an NGO or official committed a wrong.  
  
Consider the case of Simon, a father of three who was approached by 
OBI in 2012. The organization told him it was safe in South Sudan, but he 
knew this was not the case, having lived in South Sudan relatively 
recently. He wished to return despite the risks, and so accepted OBI's 
free ticket home, boarding a flight for Juba with his wife and children in 
2012. Slightly over a year later, the South Sudanese Civil War broke out, 
and he witnessed eleven small children taken out of their houses and 
killed. He quickly fled with his family to an Internally Displaced Persons 
(IDP) and, despite remaining in the camp as of 2016, feels OBI's poor 
knowledge had no impact on him, because he himself knew the risks, 
and returned regardless. He does not regret his choice and so, perhaps 
by chance, OBI did no wrong, or a lesser wrong. 
 
Consider, also, the case of Yasmin. Unlike Simon, she had no accurate 
information when she returned, and upon reaching her home village of 
Aweil she was surprised to find no reliable clean water, no free 
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education, and no safety for her children. She says that she would have 
returned even if she had been given more information. She runs a 
restaurant today, and is happy to be close to her family.14   
 
In such Relevancy Cases it is not clear if facilitators are culpable for 
failing to provide information. Though Simon and Yasmin were never 
informed of risks, this had no seeming impact on their lives or choices.  
 
We might claim that NGOs and immigration officials did not know that 
Simon and Yasmin would have returned regardless, and so their actions 
were still problematic. Alternatively, we might believe in moral luck. OBI 
failed to inform Simon about the risks, but Simon happened to know 
about the risks. By chance his consent was informed, and his life 
unaltered, and so OBI did no wrong, or a lesser wrong.  
 
Even if we believe in moral luck, there is reason to believe Yasmin did 
not give her valid consent, and really did make her choice based on false 
information. Yasmin may say today she would have returned, but this 
may partially be because she cannot turn back time, and so may as well 
view her decision as optimal. It may be that, had she been told 
information in Israel, she would not have returned. In the case of Joseph, 
we know that he would have returned even if OBI had given him more 
information, because he had this information before return, and still 
returned.  
                                                            
14 Interview with Yasmin, Aweil, 30 March 2012 
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Even if we take Yasmin’s claim at face value – and accept that she really 
would have returned even if better informed – there is an additional 
consideration in cases like that of Yasmin.  
 
One of the values of informed consent is that it reinforces the autonomy 
of the consenter, giving her control over her decisions by allowing her to 
deliberate over what she feels is best. If an agent lacks control over her 
choices, such as a doctor forcing a patient to accept surgery, then the 
patient’s autonomy is undermined, even if, by chance, the patient would 
have accepted the surgery had she been given the choice (Groll 2012). 
The same may be said about misinformation. If an agent lacks 
information, she is not in control of her decision-making, because she 
cannot truly reflect on the different risks involved in her decision. This 
would be true even if, by chance, the decision she reaches without 
information is the same one she would have reached had she 
information. In this sense, though Yasmin’s preferences were fulfilled, 
her autonomy was still undermined at the time she returned, because she 
could not make a fully informed decision.  
 
We might argue that, even if Yasmin was not in control of her decision, 
she at least gave her “hypothetical consent.” This is the consent an agent 
would have given, had she been fully informed (Waldron 1987: 139). 
Such consent is not true consent, and so Yasmin was wronged, but 
perhaps she was not quite so wronged. If she would have consented 
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regardless, the act of misinformation did not set back her welfare or 
interests, and so the consequences less harmful. The misinformation also 
did not significantly undermine her autonomy, because her preferences 
were, in a sense, autonomous: They were the preferences she would have 
developed had she been fully informed.  
 
Even if hypothetical consent has some value in reducing wrongdoing, 
there is reason to believe that Yasmin did not even give her hypothetical 
consent. In discussing hypothetical consent, we must consider not only 
how one would act if given more information, but how one would act if 
they knew they were given false information. Imagine a patient is told 
there are no risks to surgery, and so consents. The surgery goes well, and 
she wakes up, goes home, and browses Google scholar, finding that the 
surgery was, in fact, quite risky. The patient may feel legitimately 
wronged. She may think, “had I known about the misinformation I was 
receiving, I would not have consented to surgery with this particular 
doctor. Instead, I would have gone to another doctor for this surgery.” In 
determining hypothetical consent, the relevant counterfactual is not only 
what we would do had we full information; it is what we would do, had 
we known that we were given false information.  
 
Even if refugees would have returned had they been given full 
information from a given NGO, this does not mean they would have 
return via this particular NGO, had they known this NGO was 
misinforming them. This reasoning is reflected in the actions of some 
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refugees in Israel. These refugees knew they were being misinformed by 
OBI and, out of principle, rejected the NGO’s assistance, paying for their 
own flights and arranging their own travel documentation.15 When 
considering what information is relevant, it is not enough to ask, “Would 
the refugee have consented if they were informed?” We must also ask, 
“Would the refugee have consented, had they known, at the time of 
consent, that they were being misinformed?”  
 
In Joseph’s case, we know that he was prepared to accept OBI’s services 
despite the misinformation he received. In Yasmin’s case, we do not 
know if she would have been prepared to accept such services has she 
known she was being misinformed. She may today say she would have 
returned via OBI even if she knew she was misinformed at the time, but 
we cannot know what she would have truly done at the time. We must 
take her memories at face value for this consideration, as well. And the 
more we rely on memories, the less we can be certain that information 
really was irrelevant for the choice made, and for the consent obtained.  
 
In general, we cannot travel to a counterfactual world and see how 
refugees would act. Except in rare cases like that of Simon, it is difficult 
to establish what information was irrelevant. To be safe, NGOs and 
government officials should change their policies to ensure information 
is available to all refugees. Just as medical professionals set general 
standards for informing patients, facilitators should set general 
                                                            
15 Discussion with George, Juba, 1 January 2013 
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standards for informing refugees, telling all about the risks prior to 
returning. 
 
 
4. Blameworthiness 
When NGOs and officials speak with refugees, they rarely know they are 
misinforming or omitting information. Because they are not aware they 
are misinforming or omitting information, perhaps they are not 
blameworthy for their actions.  
 
In normative theory there are extensive disagreements as to the 
conditions for blameworthiness, but three theories are prominent.  
 
Some deontological and virtue ethicists argue that one can be 
blameworthy for lacking morally important desires or motivations in 
one’s actions (Smith 2011; Slote 2001). If I fail to call an ambulance to save 
a person in need right near me, I am blameworthy for her death either 
because I lack the important desire to save her or because I lack the 
general motives in life to care about others in great need.16 We might 
conclude that officials are similarly blameworthy if they fail to inform 
refugees because they lack a desire to help refugees at that moment, or 
lack motivates in life to care about refugees. This would be true even if 
                                                            
16 Strictly speaking, virtue ethicists may not couch this in terms of “blameworthiness” but simply 
in terms of non-virtuous motives. There is much debate over what constitutes a non-virtuous 
motive. Regardless, if seems clear that one lacks a virtuous motive if one fails to call an 
ambulance for an individual in urgent need. See Slote 2001 
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officials are not aware they are misinforming and not aware they lack 
important motives or desires.  
 
Some consequentialists and deontologists argue that, to be blameworthy, 
one needn’t hold morally objectionable desires or motives. It must only 
be that one foresees, or ought to foresee, the probable consequences of 
one’s actions (Bennett 1998 and Jackson 1997). NGOs and officials are 
blameworthy in this sense, if a reasonable person could foresee that 
failing to find information would increase the probability of an 
uninformed repatriation, or an unsafe return that would otherwise not 
take place. This would be true even if NGOs and officials are unaware 
they are misinforming refugees.  
 
Finally, a range of deontological theories argue that, to be blameworthy, 
one must intend one actions, rather than hold certain motives or foresee 
certain consequences. For one to intend one’s actions, two conditions 
must be met. First, one must be in control of one’s actions (Tognazzini 
and Coates 2016). To be in control, one must be aware of what one is 
doing. If one is not aware of what information is true, as in the cases 
described, then one is not aware one is misinforming or omitting 
information. Second, to wrongly intend an action one must have a 
particular aim (Smith 2011: 14). If one wrongly intends to omit 
information, then one omits information to bring about some 
objectionable aim, such as the aim of uninformed repatriation.  It is not 
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clear that NGOs or officials have any aim in mind, let alone an 
objectionable one.  
 
There is one reason that there is intent even when NGOs and officials are 
not aware they are misinforming and have no aim in misinforming. 
Misinformation in immigration control may be a type of “tracing case.” 
Tracing cases occur when one’s unintentional act is the result of an 
earlier intentional act. If a doctor fails to warn a patient about the risks of 
an operation because she earlier intentionally failed to read the latest 
medical journals, then she is culpable for her failure to warn the patient 
(Smith 2011). Similarly, if at an earlier time facilitators intentionally failed 
to find information, and this lead them to unintentionally give false 
information, then they are culpable. UNHCR openly states that it does 
not conduct extensive post-return monitoring (Morris and Michael-
Salomons 2013). When UNHCR told Afghan refugees in Iran it was safe 
to return, it may not have known it was misinforming, but it knew it was 
earlier failing to find information on previous returnees. Similarly, when 
the German government told Bosnian refugees that there would be 
sufficient services upon return, it did not know about conditions in 
Bosnia, but perhaps it intentionally avoided finding out information, 
with the aim of encouraging more to return. More generally, if 
facilitators have an interest in more returning, they may choose to 
neglect using more rigorous research methods to learn about risks of 
return, or the rights of refugees to stay.  
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We might argue, though, that not all intent is wrongful intent, and so not 
all tracing cases are equal. In Israel, the director of HIAS did not conduct 
research on South Sudan because he thought refugees already had 
information.17 His intentions seem pure: they were never to encourage 
misinformed returns, even if he intentionally did not find information. 
 
The Israeli government also established its own repatriation scheme, 
helping several thousand refugees return to Sudan and Eritrea by 2015. 
Like the HIAS director, the official heading the scheme never researched 
the risks of repatriation. He chose to not find information because he 
wanted to avoid being “patronizing,”18 arguing that it would be 
disrespectful to tell refugees about their own countries. For this reason, 
he never learned how many had been killed after return,19 or the 
likelihood that others would be killed.  
 
If this official and the HIAS director can be taken at their word, they did 
not intend the outcome of refugees being misinformed, even if they 
intentionally did not find information. Let us consider if this is sufficient 
for us to conclude they were not culpable.  
 
For the HIAS director, there are reasons to believe he was culpable. It is 
true he believed refugees had their own information, but he still chose to 
never validate this belief. The director did not just intentionally neglect 
                                                            
17  Interview with Director of HIAS-Israel, Jerusalem, 11 December 2012 
18 Interview with Voluntary Return official, Tel Aviv, 7 August 2013 
19 ibid 
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to find information on South Sudan; he intentionally failed to find out if 
his belief about refugees’ knowledge was correct. And we do not know 
why the HIAS director intentionally failed to find out whether his belief 
about refugees’ knowledge was correct. It may be that his motivations 
were to encourage return, or at least ensure good working relations with 
OBI, which wanted to encourage return. It so, then his intentions were 
problematic.  
 
The government official’s reasons for his actions were not based on any 
false belief about refugees’ knowledge. He wanted to avoid being 
patronizing. Many refugees really may feel patronized if told about their 
own country. As such, we may think the civil servant’s intentions were 
not as problematic. 
 
But though it is true that the official’s reasons for his actions were to 
avoid being patronizing, reasons can be derived from other reasons. The 
civil servant perhaps chose to avoid being patronizing because this 
would cause more to be misinformed, and so more would return. If so, 
then his ultimate intention was not to avoid being patronizing, but to 
encourage return.  
 
The above analysis assumes we can know the intentions of other agents. 
Clearly, we cannot reach inside their minds and learn about their aims 
and reasons. Nonetheless, we can still find evidence of intent, if not 
decisive certainty. Repatriation facilitators are often in a position where 
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they have an interest in more refugees repatriating, to meet their annual 
targets. From this, we can conclude that facilitators should not have 
targets they must reach. Such targets give facilitators reasons to 
intentionally fail to find information, leading to uninformed 
repatriations.  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
When the director of OBI showed photographs from South Sudan to 
refugees in Israel, she could have distributed information on the lack of 
healthcare, security, and universal education. Finding some of this 
information would be costless, and Good Samaritan duties require such 
costless acts.  
 
When finding information is costly to obtain, and when there are few 
reports on countries of origin, facilitators may still have duties to disclose 
accurate information. NGOs have duties to find information derived 
from their promises to ensure informed returns. States make no such 
promises, but have duties to find information derived from their general 
duties to help prevent atrocities abroad, and ensure protection of 
refugees. Such duties create a duty to know about conditions abroad, 
which in turn creates a duty to disclose information to those repatriating.  
Even when facilitators merely fail to disclose information, rather than 
actively misinforming, they may still be culpable. Their silence can 
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interpreted as a confirmation of safety by refugees who return as a result.  
This conclusion can be supported not only be consequentialists, who 
wish to avoid any acts that lead to negative consequences, but by 
deontologists, who may view acts of omission as less problematic than 
acts of commission. Failing to inform refugees can be viewed as a 
positive communicative act that implies security, encouraging refugees 
to return who would have otherwise stayed. Virtue ethicists would likely 
agree that information should be disclosed. A virtuous person has the 
motives to ensure refugees obtain safety, and such safety is difficult to 
obtain if refugees are never told of the risks of returning.  
 
Some refugees claim that they would have returned even if warned of 
the risks. In reality, however, it is difficult to know if refugees really 
would have returned had they been better informed. When refugees 
today say they would have returned, these feelings about the past may 
be the result of their inability to change the present. Given our inability 
to be certain that misinformation had no impact on refugees’ decisions, 
we ought to still hold NGOs and officials accountable for 
misinformation. 
 
Many repatriation facilitators acknowledge that information could have 
been more accurate, and that their actions were wrong from a 
consequentialist perspective. They may nonetheless claim they did not 
intend to give false information, and were not driven by objectionable 
motives. Given the importance of intent for deontologists, and of motives 
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for virtue ethicists, we might suppose facilitators’ are not blameworthy 
according to these normative theories. To establish the validity of this 
claim, it is not enough to establish if misinformation was intentional, or 
the result of objectionable motives, but whether earlier failures to find 
information were intentional, or result of objectionable motives. If 
facilitators chose to avoid finding information in order to encourage 
return, then they are blameworthy for their earlier motives and intent, 
even if they unwittingly gave misinformation.   
 
Regardless of whether facilitators act intentionally and are blameworthy, 
they still act wrongly when failing to inform refugees of the risks.  Such 
failures mean refugees will take the irreversible decision to return, regret 
doing so, and find themselves again displaced, without asylum, or 
without basic food and clean water. Just as preventing deportations is 
essential in some cases, so is preventing misinformation, to ensure more 
ethical immigration control.  
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